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Industrial Pensions and Wages
*
By John Whitmore
The advent of insurance companies in the field of industrial
pensions appears to date from the year 1922. Conant’s Critical
Analysis speaks of a single plan then recently effected through the
instrumentality of an insurance company and says that in that
year the two insurance companies giving chief attention to the
subject were still working on the details of their contracts. It is
spoken of as “a system of cumulative single premium annuities.”
It is described in the Critical Analysis (p. 111) as follows:
“Every worker who has completed a limited period of service with an
establishment (say three to five years, roughly covering the period of
initial heavy labor turnover) would, for each additional year, receive a paid
up annuity policy assuring him of an income of, say, $10 per year, begin
ning at age of 65. There would be no condition attached to the issuance
of a policy other than the completion of an additional year of service. The
policy when once turned over to the worker would be absolutely his prop
erty and could not be forfeited.”

And in Industrial Pensions in the United States (p. 58):
“It is a contributory arrangement by which the employee authorizes a
stated proportion of his wage to be deducted and to be paid periodically,
together with an additional contribution from the employer, to an insur
ance company. The latter issues to the employee at the end of each year
a certificate which entitles him to draw an annuity, say, at age 65, equiva
lent to the income from the combined funds invested for his account during
that year. Each year’s contributions and certificate mark a completed
transaction, and the benefits are cumulative. The employer is free, in
case of necessity, to alter or discontinue the arrangement at the close of any
year without detriment to the employee who is assured of the benefits
already earned. The employee, on his part, is free to withdraw from the
plan, or even from the service of the company, without forfeiting his
equity up to date. In the event of withdrawal, even of dismissal, he has
several options which may include the surrender of his certificates for cash.
If he chooses to leave his investment intact, whether he continue his regular
payments or not, he remains in possession of the policy paid for by the
contributions already made by himself and by the employer on his
account.”
* An earlier article by Mr. Whitmore, on the same subject, appeared in The Journal of
Accountancy for March, 1929.
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And, further:
"The theory underlying this automatic type of pension differs from the
other contractual forms in that it does not presuppose a lifetime of service
before pension benefits can be earned ... it does not favor the use of a
pension plan for binding the employee to the company irrespective of his
conceived interests or inclinations.”

This plan has been put into effect in probably quite a fair
number of cases up to the present time, but apparently it has been
fully adopted as described in the quotations above in very few
indeed. The plan has received quite general praise from students
of the pension problem, but not all employers are enthusiastic
about it. Many are reluctant to let the administration of the
pension scheme pass so completely out of their hands, believing
that they thereby sacrifice a position of some advantage. In this
connection it is interesting to note an opposite view. In the
Critical Analysis, among the advantages of the single premium
annuity plan, is included that “tangible evidence of the benefit is
brought annually to the attention of the worker.” In the next
place probably many employers believe that the services of the
insurance company would add materially to the cost. The con
trary is maintained not unconvincingly by representatives of the
insurance companies.
*
Much more important is the fact that
nearly all employers object to contributing to pensions for em
ployees who do not stay with them to retirement age. Conse
quently (except perhaps in a few cases) annual policies purchased
by the employer’s and the employees’ contributions combined are
not delivered to the latter unconditionally year by year. Matters
are so arranged that if the employee withdraws from the service
before retiring age, he gets the benefit of his own contributions,
but not of the employer’s contributions. It appears, therefore,
that in most cases where the plan has been adopted it has been
minus its essential principle, which is that “each year’s contribu
tions and certificate mark a completed transaction.”
Some gains there are, however, and in themselves they are un
questionably very great. The plan is contractual, though on the
condition that the employee remain in the service to retirement
age. The provision for the pension is funded. The employer
settles his full labor bill in each year, and so no present costs are
deferred to be borne by the future in unknown amounts, with all
the illusions and dangers of such a condition.
* See paper by Reinhard A. Hohaus, Jr., in Transactions Actuarial Society of America, Oc
tober. 1925.
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On the other hand the employee’s freedom is still hampered.
If he changes his employment it is at the cost of the benefits
accruing from all of his employer’s contributions. He knows this
and his employer knows it, and it must have an effect upon their
relations with each other, upon the employee’s sense of inde
pendence and quite possibly upon his fortunes in life. Instead of
a completed transaction each year, there is here, as in the discre
tionary plans, the condition of long continuous service to retire
ment age.
And even if the plan were adopted in the otherwise almost
perfect form outlined in the quotations above, it would still
involve one evil, serious enough to be fatal. Nothing is said in
the above outlines of the cumulative single premium annuity
system concerning a maximum hiring age, but, avowed or un
avowed, it will inevitably enter into the operation of every private
pension system. The employer must consider economy of opera
tion, and this will depend upon employees’ entering the service
early in life. If a full retirement pension is to be paid it must,
generally speaking, be paid in relation to full length of service;
and if under the single premium annuity plan it is recognized that
the employer’s responsibility is only for actual years of service,
many or few, the employer must as far as possible avoid bearing
the higher premiums of the later years of a man’s working life,
unaveraged with the lower premiums of the earlier years.
Apart, however, from external and easily traceable effects, there
are, as I have already said, questions as to the obscurer workings
of industrial pension systems that are not to be ignored in any
serious consideration of the subject.
The first question is whether the remuneration of labor will in
the long run be any greater, because it is divided between imme
diate wages and a retirement pension, than it would be if there
were immediate wages only.
There is in the Critical Analysis quotation of a saying that
“industry, as a whole, is morally bound to provide the workers
as a whole with sufficient income to meet not only present needs,
but all the normal contingencies of life, including disability and
old age.” * This should be the minimum remuneration of labor,
and under sound industrial conditions wages should not fall short
of this standard. It is, however, unlikely that the worker will
receive wages sufficient to enable him to provide for old age, and
* The Rev. John A. Ryan, D.D., director of the National Catholic Welfare Council.
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that his old age will be again provided for by a pension. There
intervenes the standard of living of the time, for which no in
dividual is responsible, which is one of the conditions of life which
he must meet unless he is to have a sense of failure, and it is un
likely that the total remuneration of labor, in any form, will so
outrun this that there will be any double provision for as material
an item as the needs of the worker’s old age.
One must believe that the economic and social forces in industry
press toward the remuneration of labor at a level that is just, and
it scarcely seems probable that the operation of such forces will be
affected by the splitting up of such remuneration and paying it at
different times and calling it by different names. It is fairly
certain that what the workers receive as pensions they will not
receive as wages. And there is this great difference, that wages
are likely to be fairly distributed as earned, and pensions are not.
One or two quotations—and whoever cares to read the Critical
Analysis will find many more of similar tenor. The president of
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching says in
the 1918 annual report: “There is a fallacy concerning the free
pension widespread and difficult to combat. . . . The notion that
in the free pension the beneficiary gets something for nothing is an
illusion. There is no free pension where the questions of wages
and pensions are involved together. In the course of a limited
number of years such pensions will be adjusted to the salary or
wage scale.”
And Albert de Roode, American Economic Review, June, 1913:
“A pension considered as part of the real wages of an employee is
really paid by the employee, not perhaps in money, but in the
foregoing of an increase in wages which he might obtain except for
the establishment of a pension system.”
It is difficult to believe anything different. Pension costs may
be borne (with minor modifications) in one of two ways: either
immediately year by year as they accrue in respect of each year’s
services; or as they are paid after the services in respect of which
they are paid have ceased. In the former case they are part of
each year’s current labor expense and will be fully considered by
the employer as such. In the latter case, as has been shown, they
must in time become a heavy burden and are then practically
certain to affect even the wages it is possible to pay. In this con
nection it must be borne in mind that there is no pension system
in manufacturing industry in the United States that has been
244
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in existence long enough for the expense to have approached its
maximum. The full test in practice of the effect of pensions on
wages lies in the future.
The second question as to the obscurer workings of pension
systems, at least, or especially, as to non-contributory pensions, is
whether they must not have an unfavorable effect upon the work
er’s qualities of thrift and self-reliance and self-respect. The
question is stated repeatedly in the Critical Analysis: (page 3) “it
is extremely difficult to determine the ultimate effects of such
systems, not merely upon the worker’s efficiency and his material
well being, but even upon his character;” and (page 230) “the
difference in the effect upon national character of having these
workers thus virtually self-supporting in their old age
,
*
instead of
objects of charity or recipients of gratuities, can hardly be over
estimated.” And on page 95 the author quotes the view “that
any hope of old age relief from want which is not based upon
individual thrift, economy, and foresight, decreases efficiency, in
dependence, and manliness.”
The same feeling is in the saying of Samuel Gompers that
“where the workers receive an adequate wage they will provide
their own pension system, and whatever men do for themselves
increases their value as workers.” And again in the Carnegie
Foundation 1918 report “to lift from the shoulders of the individ
ual a responsibility rightfully his, is to do him in the long run an
injury.”
The course of the argument running through the successive
annual reports of the Carnegie Foundation is steadily in favor of
contributory and contractual pension systems. It is against the
free and discretionary system, the supposed gift, the uncertainty,
the single aim of a retirement pension for the worker himself.
But the strongest statement of the separate character of the
worker’s contributions as savings is in one of these reports and
has been quoted herein.
I have also referred to the question raised by the assistant to the
president of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in the discussion of
Edward S. Cowdrick’s paper Pensions: a Problem of Management,
and I quote it now as follows:
“ I would like to raise the practical question as to whether it would not be
more desirable to set up thrift plans that will stand on their own feet
rather than to operate them under the guise of a pension plan. I think, if
* The reference here is to the cumulative single premium annuity system, as described by the
author.
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the thrift factor is the one that would justify all the lost work, so to speak,
in making deductions under a contributory plan, then a thrift or stock
plan, or some other form of savings plan which would have its own identity,
would appeal to employees, particularly younger men, to a greater degree
than if the savings feature were linked up to the pension plan.”

All should save, there is no question about that. There remains
to be sought the way of saving that will, first, have the strongest
appeal from the very beginning of the working life; and, second,
that will be most effective for all the purposes for which saving is
imperative. The appeal of retirement pensions to the younger
men in industry is admitted to be virtually nil. If it were other
wise I think it would indicate a very unyouthful outlook on life.
Even if the younger men in industry could be induced to save by
contributing to a retirement pension system I question whether
it would not be one of the poorest forms of saving both morally
and financially. What I think would be the best and would have
the strongest appeal from the beginning of the working life, and
what I think the employer’s relation to employees’ savings might
be, I will try to state after I have stated the way in which I
believe wages in manufacturing industry can be lifted to a point
where there ought to be no need for employers to provide pensions,
except for the older employees who have spent their working lives
under the older conditions of wages not fully adequate for both
present needs and all the normal contingencies of life.
I can scarcely imagine that anyone who has had any consider
able experience in manufacturing operations, and who possesses
in an ordinary measure the faculties of observation and reflection,
doubts that all the workers, each and every one of them, have an
influence upon the economy of manufacture. Individual skill,
individual industry, observation, forethought, willingness to
cooperate, willingness to impart knowledge, care to avoid waste,
care for order, care for cleanliness: in one way or another, or in
various ways, each worker can contribute something to the ulti
mate economy of manufacture. There are two ways in which
their contributions to that end can be brought to something like a
maximum: one is by educating them to a proper conception of
their work and their mutual relationships, and of the possibilities
that are in these, and the other is by giving them the opportunity
to increase their wages as their work, individual and combined,
lowers the cost of production.
There is one condition that is essential if the workers in manu
facturing industry are so to be educated, or so to be paid propor246
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tionately to the results of their work. It is that their employers
shall have knowledge of two things: first, what ought to be accom
plished at each step in the operations, and second, and continu
ously, knowledge of what is accomplished. And there is only one
way by which such knowledge can be possessed, and that is
by factory accounting through which standards of economy are
developed and the actual operating results, step by step, and in
their final outcome, measured by such standards.
The principle has long been recognized, more it seems to me by
the practical men in manufacturing and by professional engineers
than by accountants. But its application has, at least generally
speaking, been elementary, because it is only by using the re
sources of accounting that it could be anything else. The sim
plest example of remunerating labor according to its exact results
is the piece-work price. This involves a little accounting but not
enough to need an accountant. The modern factory piece-work
price is presumably always the result of recording the wages and
the production of the individual, and so obtaining a unit labor
cost, and deducing a standard therefrom, and thence a piece price.
Another step is the premium system of wages. No longer a
piece price, but an hourly wage rate and a standard of product and
a premium for production in excess of the standard, so arranged
that the larger the product the higher the labor remuneration per
piece. The calculation of economy has now gone beyond mere
labor costs. There are other costs as well as, or incident to, labor
costs, and if these can be reduced something more per piece can be
paid to labor and still the total cost per piece reduced. Account
ing was needed for this, and engineers became amateur account
ants—amateur inasmuch as I believe they neither know nor care
about the principle of double-entry bookkeeping with its indis
pensable safeguard. The basis of the premium system of wages is
the machine rate, or an expense rate, other than a machine rate,
incident to productive labor. The machine rate is the result of
calculating all the expenses of having and operating a machine for a
given period, and dividing this into the calculated normal working
hours. If by skill and industry the operator could reduce machine
time, and so reduce the machine expense in the product, he could be
paid a part of the saving in machine expense as a wages premium.
Again, steam-plant engineers have calculated the value of the
unit of steam and have inaugurated bonuses to steam-plant
operators measured by the percentage of boiler efficiency.
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And bonuses have been paid for furnace results in the metal
lurgical industries, but here, as indeed everywhere else, there are
dangers of illusions unless there is double-entry accounting
embracing the whole of the operations.
But while engineers and factory managers have felt their way
in the application of the principles of establishing standards and
measuring results thereby and paying labor accordingly, and have
put these principles in force at what have seemed to them
the crucial economic points of the operations in their charge,
nothing, it seems to me, is more certain than that there is only
one instrumentality by which this can be done systematically
and completely from beginning to end of any manufacturing
operations, and that instrumentality is double-entry factory
accounting.
At some other time, if it seems worth while, I may try to
describe the general processes of such double-entry factory ac
counting. At present I must confine myself to saying that they
should be such as to yield a complete series of standards for all the
expenses and efficiencies of the manufacturing processes, and to
show continuously the variations in practice from the standards
so established; and among the necessary uses of the information so
obtained will be to impart the same knowledge to the working
forces, and by bonuses to individuals, or groups, or to the working
forces as a whole (these in the order of their desirability) to make
the interest in high wages and the interest in economy of manu
facture inseparably one.
In the compass of this article there is not room always duly to
qualify. I do not, however, mean that standards of economy are
produced through the work of accountants alone, for they are the
results of the cooperation of all departments, technical and
operating. Nor that the working forces are educated merely by
communicating to them the results disclosed by the accounting,
for that is a matter to be accomplished by diverse means. Nor
that the only motive that will actuate the working forces to
achieve a closer economy of manufacture is the prospect of
increased wages. Better understanding of the costs and results
of the manufacturing processes will go far in this direction. But
the additions to wages are necessary to satisfy a sense of justice,
and for the needs of the workers if these are understood, as they
must be, to include provision for all the normal contingencies
of life.
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It is, however, said that, whatever wages are, a considerable
proportion of industrial workers will arrive at ages at which they
must retire, without having provided themselves with the means
of living in their later years. The inadequacy of wages is, I
believe, by plain implication of pension systems, and in fact, the
primary cause of the need for old-age pensions; but the paying of
adequate wages is believed to be by itself an insufficient remedy,
because improvidence is a common human failing.
For this there is, doubtless, no perfect cure through any reform
or adjustment of industrial relations. But improvement must be
sought in ways that will not involve other evils even more serious.
The ordinary man has many responsibilities to discharge before he
reaches retirement age, and if his freedom and self-reliance are
injured throughout his working life practical evils at least as great
as old-age dependency will result. I think it is fairly plain that
old-age pension systems must operate injuriously in some ways
which are so serious that one might suspect that they are no
effectual remedy for the one evil at which they aim. This is
what proves to be the case if we forget all possible disadvantages
and consider pension systems in relation to old-age dependency
alone. Where is the hope, in any pension system, of pensions for
more than a relative few of the great body of workers in manufac
turing industry? And the few are those of steady disposition and
even flow of life, who have happened to be both inclined and able
to stay in one employ always. It is not easy to imagine that
these have any very frequent identity with the hopelessly im
provident. And for those who have had their share of the ordi
nary vicissitudes of life, or even a normal share of the human
restlessness or ambition that leads to change, where is there more
than the rarest individual pension in all the plans I have reviewed?
If no cure, there is surely a way of progress. The first need is
adequate wages. I have pointed out the way in which I am clear
that these might come.
And beyond this there is the need of wise management in the
personal finances of industrial workers. There is nothing in this
that is peculiar to industrial workers, for it is just the same with
all of us. It is one thing to earn money, and quite another so to
use it throughout our lives as to secure the utmost good. To
imagine the latter it is necessary to imagine clear views of life
from the beginning, and in addition no little business knowledge.
Almost all of us acquire something of these but slowly.
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It is a very interesting development in the more recent activities
of some banking institutions that they are offering to their cus
tomers, especially to those of limited means, those to whom the
fashion of their savings is of the greatest importance, advice and
facilities and plans which aim to turn to the utmost account the
savings that are possible in their circumstances. It would I
think be difficult even to guess the good such institutions may
accomplish by guarding such customers against losses, and. by
suiting savings plans to particular needs, and by bringing into the
operation of the individual’s money matters knowledge which the
individual himself can but rarely possess.
It seems to me that the industrial employer is in an even more
advantageous position to do a similar thing for his employees, if
he should organize the means of doing it as he organizes his other
business activities.
The employer would not do it for profit or to obtain a hold over
his employee. He would at the outset have the advantages of the
weight of his position and of practically complete disinterested
ness. He could (the larger employers singly, the smaller in
combination) command the same order of ability that banking
institutions command, and place it at the service of the whole
body of the employees. He could offer the employees, men and
women, of all ages, with all their various responsibilities, the
services of qualified counsellors in regard to all forms of insurance
and savings, and systematized means of effecting the same over a
period of time.
The greatest advantage is, of course, where the right influence
and help and guidance are given at the beginning of the working
life. There is nothing discouraging, I think rather the contrary,
in the fact that the wrong appeal to the younger men in industry
has completely failed. To old-age pension systems, contributory
or non-contributory, they have remained completely indifferent.
How different the appeal if, while various savings and insurance
plans were offered to employees at various ages and with various
responsibilities, there were specially impressed upon young men
the great advantages of ordinary life insurance effected when life
insurance is at its cheapest. The young man is thinking little or
nothing of his old age, but it is his natural expectation that he
will marry and have children, and that the responsibilities so
arising will be the great affair of his life, and that even very early
they are likely to be serious responsibilities financially. Savings
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accumulate slowly, but at a single stroke he can insure his life for
a substantial amount, because at his age premiums are very low.
He secures protection and ultimate provision in a sum that would
be quite out of his power otherwise, and even very early it is an
immediate provision in case of necessity, because of the borrowing
privilege in life-insurance policies. Throughout the years of
paying premiums they are always so much smaller because the
insurance was effected early. Because these payments are small,
other kinds of savings may follow. From the beginning of his
working life he is a kind of capitalist. He has established his first
hold upon a sum that otherwise would exist for him only in
distant and dim prospect.
And in insurance and savings plans, so cooperated in by em
ployer and employees, there is available the invaluable mechanism
of the uniform routine deduction from wages. I know of one
banking institution that, having arranged a savings plan for the
individual customer, sends him a monthly bill for the amount he is
to save. How much simpler and surer the employer’s procedure
of making regularly the agreed deduction from wages.
It is not my business, nor would this be the place, to suggest
the many various ways in which savings might be arranged and
managed for the greatest benefit of a body of employees. Of
course, much of the kind is already done, but I am suggesting
that, organized upon the right scale and conducted with the right
skill and energy, not as a subordinate incidental and uniform
scheme, but as a natural and vital part of the relations between
employers and employees, adjusted to all varying conditions, it
would accomplish far more good than pension systems, at least in
manufacturing industry, and be free from all the evils, affecting
both employer and employee, that seem inseparable from pension
systems.
It is, therefore, through rising wages based upon accounting
measurements of economies in manufacturing, and through the
maximum encouragement and the scientific management of sav
ings, which it is quite within the power of industrial employers to
offer the employees, that I believe the need for pension systems in
manufacturing industry should gradually cease.
At best, however, the change in its fullness would require very
many years, and in the meantime, as I said at the beginning, it
seems not only desirable, but very necessary, that pension plans,,
formal or informal, should be generally adopted. The plan to be
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used would necessarily be a matter for consideration in view of all
the particular circumstances in each case. There is much to be
said for informal plans. They seem to make it possible to limit
the pension expense, and still to deal more adequately with real
needs. Among formal plans, the cumulative single premium
annuity system seems quite incomparably the best, especially in a
time of transition from one set of wage conditions to another, for
the reason that each year may mark a completed transaction, and
the plan may be terminated at any time without affecting the
annuities earned to date.
And inasmuch as some pensions are certain to be paid in any
permanent business, and practically some plans must exist, even
though quite informal and unannounced, it seems plainly of great
importance that there should be forecastings of expense in every
case, and the gradual accumulation of reserves. For this pur
pose, under any conditions, actuarial calculations are necessary.
This is especially the case because there is always the question of
accrued pension liability; that is, that part of the total pensions
ultimately to be paid to workers now in the service that is to the
total of the same pensions as their service from the beginning of
their employment to date is to their total service from the be
ginning of their employment to their various retirement dates.
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